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Abstract. The purpose of this case study is to leverage the concepts and
tools presented in the preceding chapters and apply them in a real world
social cybersecurity context. With the COVID-19 pandemic emerging as
a defining event of the 21st Century and a magnet for disinformation
maneuver, we have selected the pandemic and its related social media
conversation to focus our efforts on. This chapter therefore applies the
tools of information operation maneuver, bot detection and characteriza-
tion, meme detection and characterization, and information mapping to
the COVID-19 related conversation on Twitter. This chapter uses these
tools to analyze a stream containing 206 million tweets from 27 million
unique users from 15 March 2020 to 30 April 2020. Our results shed light
on elaborate information operations that leverage the full breadth of the
BEND maneuvers and use bots for important shaping operations.
Submitted to Springer as final chapter in a monograph entitled “Social Cybersecurity”
1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic is a defining event of the modern era, and there are
few events more appropriate to apply social cybersecurity tools and concepts. At
the time of this writing, the pandemic has reached almost every society in the
world, with massive impact not only on the lives of those who contract it but on
the social, economic, and institutional fabric of these societies. The pandemic
and differing opinions on how to react to it have created a virtual battle of
ideas across social media. Actors ranging from soccer moms to well-resourced
nation states have entered the virtual marketplace of beliefs and ideas trying to
sway the beliefs, actions, and decisions of both leaders and followers. With the
pandemic as the backdrop of life as we write this book, it seemed appropriate
to use the social cybersecurity tools that we discussed in the previous chapters
to identify and understand information operations related to COVID-19.
There are still many questions as well as competing narratives about the
origins and nature of the COVID-19 coronavirus disease. The disease is caused
by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2), and was
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1. INTRODUCTION
first identified in Wuhan China in December 2019. While still spreading, as of
15 May 2020 the pandemic has grown to 4,651,119 confirmed cases with 312,119
global deaths according to the John Hopkins University COVID-19 Data Map1.
The virus and resulting pandemic have radically altered the world landscape
and daily life for many people. With a large portion of the world’s consumers
sheltering in or near their home, the world’s markets have slowed, inducing the
greatest global recession since the Great Depression [10]. It has led to the cancel-
lation or deferment of most travel activities, sporting and entertainment events,
religious and political gatherings. As of 14 April 2020, schools and universities
had closed or otherwise been disrupted in 191 countries affecting 1.57 billion
students (pre-primary, primary, lower-secondary, and upper secondary levels of
education), or 90.1% of the total enrolled students for these categories [1].
The COVID-19 pandemic has induced information warfare at multiple levels,
both within and between nations. At the individual level, much of the informa-
tion is in regards to safety and health during the pandemic. Social media often
doesn’t have structural filters for good ideas, and at times poor ideas regarding
health and safety have been promoted by segments of the crowd. Within coun-
tries, the pandemic has created two warring factions: 1) those who think policy
should prioritize the health and safety of citizens and 2) those who think policy
should prioritize the national economy and maintaining the jobs and livelihoods
of citizens. These factions often seem to fall along existing political party lines,
with conservatives emphasizing the economy and liberals emphasizing health
and safety. This policy oriented friction has contributed a large portion of the
information conflict within nations. Finally, the origin and nature of the COVID-
19 coronavirus has aggravated existing geopolitical fault lines between nations,
particularly between the United States and China, with the European Union,
Russia, Brazil, and other nations participating in the conflict of narratives. As
we look at information warfare and social cybersecurity in the COVID-19 pan-
demic conversation, we attempt to illuminate information conflict across this
spectrum.
Each country’s response has varied based on its society, forms of government,
and health care system. The COVID-19 pandemic has served as a worldwide test
of the resiliency of these systems. Nations are therefore turning to information
warfare to strengthen their test results while attacking the response and results
of other nations, particularly those whose form of government differs from theirs.
This is particularly true in the information conflict between China and United
States.
This chapter will showcase the use of social cybersecurity tools and theory to
identify and characterize information operations in the COVID-19 related Twit-
ter Stream. To do this, we will start by discussing data collection and initial
exploratory data analysis. Then we will conduct bot detection and characteriza-
tion, merging bot classification with other quantitative methods. We will then
look at meme classification and analysis, highlighting the use of multi-modal data
for information warfare. Finally, we will briefly illustrate the use of Sketch-IO.
1 https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html
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Throughout this chapter will highlight the importance of BEND as a founda-
tional construct for understanding modern information warfare.
2 Collecting Data
Like most event oriented social cybersecurity data collection on Twitter, our
team started by establishing a Twitter Stream with select COVID-19 related
terms, periodically expanding the terms as appropriate. This gives us the main
foundation of data for assessment. Once we began analysis of the stream, we
turned to the Twitter REST API to collect other data as necessary. This addi-
tional data is often account oriented and includes timelines, friends, followers,
and at times account ID “re-hydration”. We will discuss each of these below.
For COVID-19, our team began collecting data on 27 January 2020 with
a limited list of keywords and expanded this list on 13 March 2020. For the
data that we will focus on in this chapter, the list of keywords are: “coronar-
avirus”, “coronavirus”, “wuhan virus”, “wuhanvirus”, “2019nCoV”, “NCoV”,
“NCoV2019”, “covid-19”, “covid19”, “covid 19”. The resulting stream provided
the primary data that we will focus our study on. In this chapter, we will focus
on the data from 15 March 2020 to 30 April 2020. The summary statistics of
this data is provided in Table 1. This is not the entire COVID-19 conversation.
Many tweets may not contain these key words, or may be in other languages.
Additionally, our stream is limited to 50 tweets per second, or approximately
4.3 million tweets per day. The temporal analysis below will highlight the 4.3
million daily limit on our stream.
As we go through our analysis, we will return at times to the Twitter REST
API to collect additional data that is not found in the stream. For example, the
stream only contains an account’s COVID-19 content, but not all other content
and topics. To get access to all content shared by an account, we will at times
collect their account timeline (aka account history). There are also times we
need to identify an account’s friends and followers, which will also require us to
call the Twitter REST API. Finally, at the end of our exploratory data analysis,
we will try to find out if any accounts have been suspended by Twitter since
contributing content to our stream. We will do this by “re-hydrating” account
IDs in order to see if the account still exists. If the account doesn’t exist, we will
then test to see if the account was suspended or deleted by the user.
3 Initial Exploratory Data Analysis
All data analysis begins with a thorough exploration of the data. The analyst
should explore all of the distributions and possible relationships in the data. In
our case, this means exploring the temporal, categorical, geospatial, and quanti-
tative distributions of various fields in the Twitter Data. We collected and parsed
the data using the twitter col2 Python package that we created to assist with
collecting and manipulating Twitter data.
2 https://github.com/dmbeskow/twitter_col
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Table 1: Statistics for COVID-19 Twitter Stream (15 March 2020 to 30 April
2020)
Statistic Value
Total Tweets 206,330,119
Total Unique Users 27,153,875
Original Tweets 23,502,825
Retweet Tweets 126,878,369
Reply Tweets 8,705,000
Quote Tweets 47,243,925
Hashtags 1,854,437
Bots @ Tier1 11,381,861
Images 10,704,232
URLs 50,088,836
Unique Domains 305,597
State Sponsored Media Tweets 9,120
Retweet/Mentions of State Sponsored Media 435,557
Tweets from Verified Accounts 4,031,779
The primary statistics for the data are provided in Table 1. We have 206 mil-
lion tweets produced by 27 million users. We see that the majority of the tweets
are actually retweets. In fact, only 23 million tweets (11% of the stream) is origi-
nal content produced by the respective account. It is also interesting that quotes
significantly outnumber replies. A quote is produced when a user references an-
other tweet and comments on it, starting a new thread. Replies, by contrast, are
addressed to the original author and don’t start a new thread. We see a modest
number of state sponsored tweets, with substantially more amplification of state
sponsored accounts. Finally, for reference, this primary stream is 177 gigabytes
in compressed gzip format or 1.54 terabytes in uncompressed format.
3.1 Temporal Analysis
Next we analyze the temporal distribution of our stream. This is primarily done
to study the peaks and valleys to understand when the conversation surges and
ebbs. This analysis will also ensure that our tweets fall within the scope of our
study (from 15 March 2020 to 30 April 2020).
The temporal distribution of our stream is provided in Figure 1. This is not
what we expect to see, and is definitely not what you would observe in smaller
streams. Given the size of our stream, we are artificially limited by Twitter
rate limiting. Twitter limits basic streaming API’s to no more than 50 tweets
per second, or 4.3 million tweets per day. It is unknown what portion of the
total conversation we are getting, but given that several days fall below the
4.3 million, we believe we are collecting the majority. Twitter did open up a
unlimited COVID-19 Stream in mid-May [15], but to our knowledge this was
not available during the time frame we were interested in.
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Fig. 1: Daily Tweet Count in Stream
3.2 Geospatial Density
In order to measure the geospatial density of the data, we used a country level
geo-inference algorithm created by Huang and Carley [11]. This model infers the
country level location of tweets with 92.1% accuracy. We ran this on data from
13 April and plotted it on a chloropleth map in Figure 2 with a logarithmic scale.
This shows that the vast majority of the data is from the United States, with
notable contributions from Canada, South America, Western Europe, Nigeria,
South and Southeast Asia. This Geospatial inference and visualization provides
yet another facet of our exploratory data analysis. Given both the keyords that
we used and Twitter users by country, this spatial distribution is essentially what
one would expect.
3.3 Categorical Data Analysis
Its important to explore categorical data distributions in Twitter data. In addi-
tion to the retweet/reply/quote/original content distribution that we explored
in Table 1, we also want to look at top languages, hashtags, mentions, and URL
domains.
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Fig. 2: Geospatial Denstiy of Geo-Inferred Location for Tweets on 13 April 2020
The importance of hashtags ebbs and flows with time and events. We’ve
developed the visualization found in Figure 3 to understand this changing dy-
namic for the top 12 hashtags found in the stream. We observe decreasing use of
“corona” and increasing use of “COVID19” as a hashtag to identify pandemic
related content and conversation. This reflects both the naming of the virus and
the increasing knowledge in the world about the virus.
The full counts for languages and domains is provided in Table 2. We see
that the majority of the content is in English, followed by many of the promi-
nent world languages. The only major world language that is underrepresented is
Chinese, and that’s because Twitter is blocked by the “Great Firewall of China.”
We note that much of the data from China in this data set is actually from state
sponsored chinese media. The domains include several link shorteners, multime-
dia companies, as well as a spattering of news media companies, including both
traditional and alternative news, independent and state owned media, and both
conservative and liberal leaning news sites.
3.4 Visualize the Network
By its very nature social media creates links between people, and these links
combine to create various types of networks. Most social media have a friend
or follow functionality, which creates the most obvious social network on these
platforms. Additionally, the online conversation itself will create links between
accounts. Whenever an account retweets, mentions, replies, or quotes another
6
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Fig. 3: Prominent Hashtag “marketshare” over time.
account they are creating a type of conversational link. These links create a
second type of social media network...the conversation network.
With Twitter data, collecting friend/follower links is limited by strict rate-
limiting on the part of Twitter. Most developer accounts are only allowed to
scrape 5,000 friends/followers for one account every minute. The Twitter REST
API will only return 5,000 friends/followers per request. For example, at the
time of this writing the primary Twitter account for the United States Center
for Disease Control (@CDCgov), has 2.7 million followers. To get all of the
followers for @CDCGov would take approximately 2,700,0005,000 = 540 minutes. In
other words, it would take 9 hours to scrape the followers for this single account.
Scraping links for all of the accounts in the COVID-19 conversation (and most
conversations) is therefore not realistic. For this reason we often visualize parts
of the conversation network, for which we already have the data and is more
useful in understanding the conversation. In our visualization of the network,
we visualized the mention network, though at other times the retweet or reply
network may be appropriate.
The Twitter JSON structure has all of the information we need to create
mention, retweet, or reply networks. As discussed at other times in this book, we
created the public facing twitter col3 Python package to collect and manipu-
late Twitter data. The twitter col package has several functions that make it
easy to parse networks from raw Twitter JSON data. The ORA software [6,7],
3 https://github.com/dmbeskow/twitter_col
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Table 2: Top Languages and Domains for the COVID-19 Twitter Stream
Language Count Domain Count
English 119,706,946 bit.ly 1,353,911
Spanish 37,269,276 youtu.be 567,527
French 9,434,176 dlvr.it 523,276
Indonesian 6,688,718 theguardian.com 506,881
Portuguese 5,941,304 nytimes.com 455,153
Thai 3,917,547 ow.ly 310,834
Japanese 3,434,460 pscp.tv 279,671
Italian 2,281,549 trib.al 276,783
Hindi 2,140,788 ift.tt 265,921
Turkish 2,000,057 reuters.com 258,747
Catalan 1,608,929 cnn.com 239,437
German 1,204,235 washingtonpost.com 195,058
Tagalog 869,062 foxnews.com 192,790
Arabic 590,716 nypost.com 183,850
Dutch 534,198 buff.ly 177,518
Tamil 352,563 independent.co.uk 157,276
Russian 349,828 bbc.in 149,790
Korean 285,612 rt.com 144,361
Polish 203,136 youtube.com 133,724
Urdu 195,197 breitbart.com 131,119
Chinese 184,123 sky.com 130,732
Greek 116,296 latimes.com 129,909
Romanian 114,787 uol.com.br 121,347
Swedish 97,838 bbc.co.uk 118,402
Estonian 95,398 rawstory.com 115,461
Marathi 94,987 paper.li 112,391
Farsi 85,832 justthenews.com 112,243
Lithuanian 63,168 hill.cm 111,731
both ORA-PRO 4 and ORA-Lite software5 has functions for parsing Twitter
data into networks. These functions were used on the COVID-19 stream.
Visualizing large networks can be difficult. The COVID-19 mention network
contains 25,673,160 nodes and 152,481,141 edges (density = 0.000000231). Very
few software packages can visualize a network of this size, and none of the soft-
ware solutions that our team commonly uses can visualize this network. For this
reason, we chose to visualize just the core of the network. To do this, we found the
k-core of the network. The k-core of graph G is the maximal connected subgraph
of G where all the nodes (vertices) have a degree of at least k. While experiment-
ing with k with our mention network, we found the k = 100 was adequate. This
means we will visualize the core of the mention network in which all nodes will
have a degree of at least 100. This core network is dense (density = 0.000947),
which means there are more edges than we are able to visualize. To sparsify
4 http://netanomics/products-2
5 http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/
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the graph, we sampled one million edges to visualize. This final core network
contains 159,533 nodes and 1,000,000 edges with density = 0.0000393.
In Figure 4 we visualize the core of the mention network colored by language
using the Graphistry6 software. We could also visualize larger networks with
ORA-PRO or the sigmaNet7 package in R. In Figure 4 we see the inter-connection
between the English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese conversations. We also can
see the community groups that are clearly evident in the larger conversations,
particularly the English and Spanish conversation.
Fig. 4: Visualizing the sparsified k-core (k = 100) of the mention network, colored
by prominent language.
3.5 Identification of Influencers
Given that we now have networks parsed from our COVID-19 stream, there are
a number of network science techniques that we can use to help understand this
network. For now we will focus on the measuring which accounts (or nodes in
the network) are the most influential (or central) to the network. Measuring
centrality is an important step in network science, and there are many different
methods that have been published on how to do this, with each technique mea-
suring a slightly different definition of influence and importance. For example,
6 https://www.graphistry.com/
7 https://github.com/iankloo/sigmaNet
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degree centrality measures influence by number of connections whereas between-
ness centrality measures influence by those accounts that bridge communities.
For our analysis, we chose to measure centrality and influence by eigenvector
centrality [12]. Eigenvector centrality measures influence by finding accounts
that have the most connections to influential accounts. In other words, not all
links are created equal, and an account is more influential if it is connected to
many nodes who themselves have high scores. We believe that this mirrors the
way that many people view influence in the physical world, and therefore use
eigenvector centrality for our analysis. We also find that eigenvector centrality,
unlike measures like betweenness, is computationally practical on large networks.
The top influencers as measured by eigenvector centrality for both the men-
tion and the retweet networks are shown below in Table 3. As we will discuss
later, the central accounts in the mention network are politicians and celebrities
that we expect. The central accounts in the retweet network, however, includes
many bots, which we will elaborate on later.
3.6 Understanding Suspended Accounts
It is often important to evaluate the quantity and nature of suspended accounts
in any event oriented stream. Twitter and most social media companies suspend
accounts that frequently violate their terms of service. These violations could
include frequently posting violent, racist, or other unauthorized content. It also
could be that the accounts display unauthorized automated activity (i.e. they
are a bot). By identifying and evaluating suspended accounts, we get a sense of
how the social media company has been “cleaning” this particular stream.
To identify suspended accounts, we “re-hydrate” account IDs in order to
see if the account still exists. If the account doesn’t exist, we will then test
to see if the account was suspended by Twitter or deleted by the user. The
workflow begins by identifying all unique account ID’s in the stream. We then
“rehydrate” them in batch mode using the Twitter Rest API. Using batch mode
is a fast method to “re-hydrate”, but does not provide any feedback for missing
accounts. Having rehydrated account IDs, we then identify those that are missing
with Missing = Total−Rehydrated. There are several reasons why an account
could be missing. The two most common are that the account was deleted by
the user or was suspended by Twitter. To determine which of these is the case,
we individually attempt to rehydrate the missing IDs (not in batch mode). This
provides a detailed response that indicates whether the account was deleted or
suspended.
Given the size of the COVID-19 stream, we randomly sampled 1 million users
from the available 27 million unique users in the stream. After “re-hydrating”
in batch mode, we determined that 70,842 were missing. Using this number, we
estimate that 7.0842± 0.05% of the accounts in the stream have been deleted or
suspended (estimated using 95% confidence interval).
Next we want to estimate the number that have been suspended. To do
this we now individually attempt to “rehydrate” the missing IDs. When we do
this, we find that 9,639 accounts had been suspended by Twitter. Using this
10
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Table 3: Identifying Influential Accounts (red indicates bot-like accounts)
Mention Network Retweet Network
Centrality RankScreen Name Bot Score Screen Name Bot Score
1 realDonaldTrump 0.08 realDonaldTrump 0.08
2 POTUS 0.10 WhiteHouse 0.18
3 SpeakerPelosi 0.01 RealJamesWoods 0.00
4 CNN 0.43 TomFitton 0.02
5 WhiteHouse 0.18 RealCandaceO 0.04
6 WHO 0.03 TrumpWarRoom 0.15
7 NYGovCuomo 0.00 DonaldJTrumpJr 0.01
8 JoeBiden 0.01 AngelWarrior321 0.59
9 RudyGiuliani 0.02 GmanFan45 0.78
10 nytimes 0.44 SJPFISH 0.49
11 RealJamesWoods 0.00 jsolomonReports 0.09
12 VP 0.09 alley167 0.59
13 DonaldJTrumpJr 0.01 michaeljohns 0.06
14 BreitbartNews 0.16 darhar981 0.66
15 FoxNews 0.55 superyayadize 0.71
16 CDCgov 0.03 gaye gallops 0.62
17 YouTube 0.03 RedPillMaC 0.76
18 IngrahamAngle 0.02 Julietknows1 0.69
19 RealCandaceO 0.04 trump noodle 0.44
20 marklevinshow 0.13 ConservaMomUSA 0.70
21 TomFitton 0.02 MissILmom 0.76
22 TuckerCarlson 0.01 zeusFanHouse 0.64
23 AOC 0.03 JodyBelcher7 0.85
24 SenSchumer 0.01 Wyn1745 0.70
25 HillaryClinton 0.00 NevadaElJefe 0.43
26 seanhannity 0.02 KeishaJake 0.83
27 Acosta 0.01 dbongino 0.02
28 dbongino 0.02 ShawnG927 0.72
29 GavinNewsom 0.01 BlondieVex 0.42
30 TheDemocrats 0.01 Orcusa1 0.57
31 MSNBC 0.62 marklevinshow 0.13
32 BillGates 0.00 NoodleSparklez 0.44
33 gatewaypundit 0.40 inthecopa 0.51
34 GovWhitmer 0.01 cajun4trump 0.71
35 BarackObama 0.01 BMcAdory9 0.72
36 TrumpWarRoom 0.15 TrumperSeaney 0.70
37 OANN 0.21 TheRISEofROD 0.71
38 GOP 0.04 Aliciastarr001 0.78
39 jsolomonReports 0.09 Jali Cat 0.77
40 charliekirk11 0.02 phillyeaglesfa1 0.80
41 washingtonpost 0.40 go4itbas 0.80
42 tedcruz 0.01 up weekly 0.83
43 senatemajldr 0.01 HLAurora63 0.77
44 ABC 0.43 AnthemRespect 0.71
45 CBSNews 0.56 MAGAPATRIOT TGM 0.86
46 NYCMayor 0.01 GA peach3102 0.58
47 FLOTUS 0.04 trumptrain1111 0.76
48 AngelWarrior321 0.59 LaylaAlisha11 0.78
49 RepAdamSchiff 0.00 mitchellvii 0.13
50 mitchellvii 0.13 MBOKSR MAGA 0.89
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number, we estimate that Twitter has suspended 0.9639 ± 0.019% (estimated
using 95% confidence interval). Using these IDs, we made another pass through
our stream, and determined that these 9,639 accounts produced 93,841 tweets
that contain the terms we were filtering for the stream. Running Bot-Hunter
Tier 1 algorithm on this data we find that 73.4% of the suspended users have
strong bot-like characteristics.
It is often helpful to sample several of the suspended accounts and view their
tweets to determine if they were participating in information operations, and if
so what was the message and who was the target audience. For example, the
tweets of suspended account @Scopatumanigga are provided in Table 4. Our first
observation is that nearly all statuses are retweets, which is highly indicative of
bot behavior. Given the account screen name and content, it appears that this
likely bot account is attempting to infiltrate and influence African American
virtual communities on Twitter. The likely intent is to amplify racial divides in
order to create instability in the United States.
Table 4: Tweets from suspended account @Scopatumanigga
RT @tonyhawk: Ive been sick lately (not sick AF just sick) with symptoms other than COVID-19. But I know two friends in the U.S. with co
RT @mvrlyns: so after the Coronavirus blows over, will yall continue to practice good hygiene and sanitation? ... or will yall go back to
RT @KenichiAL: Joe Biden: The tests for the coronavirus should be free Bernie Sanders: The vaccines and treatment for the coronavirus shou
RT @workerism: Haven’t been able to stop thinking about this. A US pharma company with a potential COVID-19 vaccine is in court trying to P
RT @CrypticNoOne: 123movies would never do this
RT @Carnage45 : Black athletes give back during every crisis. I’m not saying it doesn’t happen but I don’t be seeing Tom Brady, Mike Trout
RT @shanalala : The elite getting tested without any symptoms and commoners with all the symptoms are denied tests.
RT @elliecampbbell: I know its necessary to stop the spread of covid-19, but self isolation, no school etc and everything being shut/cance
RT @EricHaywood: There are 16 people in this photograph
RT @eugenegu: @realDonaldTrump There it is. Ive been deathly afraid of this exact moment where Trump turns to racism and xenophobia and ca
RT @baeonda: Im 22 years old and I tested positive for COVID-19. Ive been debating on posting, but I want to share my experience especi
RT @SocialistWitch: Coronavirus is not mother nature’s ’cure’ for ’evil humans’. The Earth doesn’t suffer from humanity. It suffers from
RT @RaeOfLite: Hi. Yes, it originated in China, but the technical term is Covid-19 Your mom originated from the back of a Buick Skylark
@swevenpjm @ashleytwo @lydiakahill How’s this covid19 treating you
Bernie Sanders on his way to the hospital after he sees this tweet URL
RT @ChapatiPapa: So they cashed out. Hoarded supplies. Moved money to companies they believe could make the vaccine, and testing kits all t
RT @Claireific: Hey remember that time I said that tell me about Tuskegee should be a required interview question for medical applicants
RT @Nigensei: Empty hotels all over the city of Las Vegas and theyre putting the homeless in a fucking parking lot.
RT @DecaturDane: SECOND WAVE??? URL
RT @hoodcuIture: I swear Christians and colonizers never stop!! How an ISOLATED GROUP get infected
RT @BreeNewsome: whyyyyyyyyyyy do we accept such a lower quality of life in this country in exchange for nothing but slogans &amp; confetti
RT @ iamtiredLord: this baby was shot 20 times in the head by a grown ass man because he wanted her girlfriend who rejected him. THEY ARE 1
RT @thespinsterymc: The family members of the Johnsons have made it clear that medical neglect killed them. Stop romanticizing this antibla
RT @LackingSaint: got to be honest, it’s starting to feel like we’re just doing things we feel like doing and saying it’s in support of hea
4 Bot Detection
Bot detection is a critical step for social cybersecurity workflows. As discussed
in Chapter 7, bot detection often helps to delineate an information warfare
campaign, as well as illuminate lines of effort (topics) and target audiences.
It also sheds light on the scale, level of sophistication, and at times attribution
for the operation.
In this section we will discuss how to appropriately deploy bot detection
algorithms for social cybersecurity. We will start by estimating the accuracy
of our algorithms on the given data stream as well as selecting an appropriate
threshold for the data at hand (in our case the COVID-19 stream). We will
12
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discuss where each of the Bot-Hunter tiers should be used in the workflow.
Having run Bot-Hunter on all 27 million accounts, we will use it to find influential
bots, lines of effort, target audiences, and foreign influence.
4.1 Determine appropriate thresholds
Before using any bot detection tool on a given event or topic oriented data
stream, the analysts should verify it’s accuracy on the stream as well as determine
an appropriate threshold. As we discussed in Chapter 7, training data matters
for bot detection. We need to verify that the model that we are trying to use,
and its respective training data, are appropriate and predictive for our event
stream. In our case that means verifying that the bot detection model works on
our COVID-19 stream. To make this evaluation, we need a small labeled dataset
from our event stream. For the COVID-19 data, we created a list of all unique
user ID’s that were found in the data, and then randomly sampled 200 accounts
from this list. We then manually labeled the accounts using a custom workflow
that we’ve developed. After manually labeling the 200 accounts, we evaluated
the proposed bot-detection algorithms on the data.
With labels and bot-detection scores in hand, we can measure performance
with various metrics (accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score, ROC-AUC, etc). These
scores will tell us how well our models are generalizing to COVID-19 data. The
scores are shown in Table 5 for default settings of threshold = 0.5 for all models.
From Table 5 we first and foremost determine that Bot-Hunter Tier 1 should
be our primary bot detection model, with a higher F1 score and good balance
of precision and recall. From Table 5 we can also determine that the Botometer
model as well as the Bot-Hunter Tier 2 model don’t seem to generalize as well to
the COVID-19 Twitter stream. The Bot-Hunter Tier 0 model, which appearing
to perform well, will only be used on specific tasks because it is only able to
predict English speaking accounts and because it tends to have a higher false
positive rate (in this test the false-positive rate is three times larger than the
Bot-Hunter Tier 1).
Table 5: Model Performance on the COVID-19 Twitter Stream
Threshold F1 Accuracy Precision Recall ROC AUC
Bot-Hunter Tier 0 0.5 0.849 0.750 0.812 0.890 0.556
Bot-Hunter Tier 1 0.5 0.823 0.736 0.938 0.734 0.742
Bot-Hunter Tier 2 0.5 0.559 0.486 0.986 0.390 0.681
Botometer 0.5 0.112 0.197 0.733 0.060 0.475
These scores, however, are sensitive to the threshold that we choose. In order
to choose an appropriate threshold, we use our labels and bot detection scores
and plot precision-recall curves as shown in Figure 5. Remember that precision
and recall often have an inverse relationship. As precision increases, recall de-
creases, and vice versa. Recall monotonically decreases, whereas precision does
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not monotonically increase. The exact choice of the threshold will depend on
the context and any related policy decisions. If the policy decision requires a low
false-positive rate, then choose a threshold with high precision. If the policy deci-
sion or analytical goal requires a low false-negative rate, then choose a threshold
with higher recall. For most tasks it is best to have a balance of precision and
recall, which is why we often use F1 score to measure the performance of bot
detection algorithms.
(a) Tier 0 Precision-Recall Curves (b) Tier 1 Precision-Recall Curves
(c) Tier 2 Precision-Recall Curves (d) Botometer [8] Precision-Recall Curves
Fig. 5: Precision Recall Curves on 200 Manually Labeled Accounts Randomly
Sampled from COVID-19 Stream
In choosing a bot detection threshold, our goal for the COVID-19 stream is
to characterize the entire conversation. We want to have robust characterization
of the entire forest, not necessarily precise analysis of individual trees. This goal
requires a good balance between precision and recall. As indicated above, our
Bot-Hunter Tier 0 Text model tends to produce a high false positive rate. For this
reason, we will use a threshold of 0.7 for this model in our COVID-19 Stream,
which cuts false positive rate by a third. For Bot-Hunter Tier 1 we will retain
the 0.5 default threshold, since it provides a good balance with precision and
recall. For Botometer and Bot-Hunter Tier 2, we will use a threshold of 0.3 in
order to increase recall. The adjusted performance is provided in Table
14
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Table 6: Model Performance on the COVID-19 Twitter Stream with Adjusted
Thresholds
Threshold F1 Accuracy Precision Recall ROC AUC
Bot-Hunter Tier 0 0.7 0.762 0.663 0.861 0.684 0.634
Bot-Hunter Tier 1 0.5 0.823 0.736 0.938 0.734 0.742
Bot-Hunter Tier 2 0.3 0.805 0.716 0.941 0.703 0.741
Botometer 0.3 0.325 0.294 0.804 0.203 0.477
Since the Bot-Hunter Tier 1 algorithm is our primary algorithm, we’ve visu-
alized the probability distribution for all COVID-19 Accounts in Figure 6a with
threshold = 0.5 and threshold = 0.65. Here we see a large number of human
accounts, as well as a large number of accounts that are in the middle, with
decreasing numbers of high probability bots. The threshold = 0.5 is our default
model, while we can at times use threshold = 0.65 for increased precision.
Likely Bots
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(b) threshold = 0.65
Fig. 6: Bot-Hunter Tier 1 Probability Density
Note that for each actor they will have a botscore for each bot detection tool.
These algorithm identified bots can be more accurately described as actors with
bot-like characteristics. Depending on which tool is used and which threshold
is used the number of “bots” that are identified will vary. For example, on any
given day depending on what is used, the number of “bots” may vary from
approximately 25% to 48%.
4.2 Bots in the Network
Now that we have bot prediction thresholds, we can begin to use the models to
understand the COVID-19 stream and the conversation and actors involved in it.
In Figure 7 we visualize the sparsified core of the mention network (kcore = 100),
colored by bot prediction with Bot-Hunter Tier 1 and threshold = 0.5. We see
that bot-like accounts are highly embedded in the core of the conversation, and
connect to and mention influential accounts in an effort to manipulate these
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personalities and their followers. In this visualization, we have also zoomed in to
get a better feeling of the structure of the network and so that we can highlight
the location of prominent English speaking accounts.
4.3 Bots by Account Creation
The most surprising bot detection analysis that we found was in regards to
account creation date. Anytime we analyze a list of accounts, it is often en-
lightening to visualize a histogram of their account creation date. The Twitter
JSON contains a field in the user object that records the date, hour, minute,
and second that the account was originally created. This date will be some date
between March 21, 2006 (the day Twitter started) and the current date. We’ve
found it best to bin this by day. Each bar in the resulting histogram will contain
all accounts that were created on that day. Any large spike of accounts created
around the same time should cause us to dig deeper to check for the presence of
a bot “army”.
In Figure 8 we visualize the account density plot for COVID-19 colored by
bot percentage. The coloring indicates what portion of accounts in that bar have
a Bot-Hunter Tier 1 score greater than 0.5. Green indicates bars that have few
bots, while red indicates bars that have higher proportion of bots.
From Figure 8 we see that a large number of bot-like accounts have been
created since the pandemic began and then immediately deployed into the con-
versation. In fact, of the 27 million accounts participating in the conversation,
1.5 million have been created since 1 February AND have a Bot-Hunter Tier
1 score greater than 0.5. Undoubtedly part of this surge in accounts is created
by individuals who are stuck at home and decided to create a Twitter account.
A significant portion, however, appears to be bot armies. These bot armies are
produced by a number of actors with a variety of agendas, but likely all involve
manipulation of the marketplace of beliefs, ideas, and collective action.
4.4 Intersect Influence with Bot Scores
Next we want to intersect our measure of influence (eigenvector centrality) with
a bot prediction score in order to identify influential bots. In Table 3 we list the
top 50 most influential accounts in the mention network and retweet network as
measured by eigenvector centrality. Table 3 also provides the Bot-Hunter Tier
1 bot score, with red text indicating accounts that have a score greater than
0.5. Looking at the macro-level comparison, we see more bots are involved with
the retweet network than the mention network. This makes sense given that
bots are often used to scale amplification, and the easiest way to amplify is with
retweets. We also see many more verified politician, news, and government ac-
counts in the mention network. Many news accounts have “bot-like” behavior,
with @FoxNews, @MSNBC, and @CBSNews accounts surpassing the 0.5 thresh-
old. It has been documented that many news and celebrities can have bot-like
behavior [9], which is supported in our analysis. We also see in the retweet net-
work that several accounts that are not classified as bots nonetheless have bot
16
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(a) Core of Mention Network
(b) Zoom in of influential accounts
Fig. 7: Visualize a k-Core (k = 100) of the Mention Network (red indicates
accounts with bot-like behavior)
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Fig. 8: Density of Account Creation Date Colored by Bot Proportion
probability that approaches the 0.5 threshold, and are still likely bots (examples
include @SJPFISH and @NoodleSparklez). We also note that it is possible for
users to employ software or a bot on occasion from the same account. This hy-
brid form that is human and bot we refer to as a cyborg. Cyborgs will also tend
to exhibit bot like characteristics; however, they are likely to be lower in their
values than a totally automated account.
4.5 Topic Modeling (Lines of Effort)
Next we want to try to separate the stream into topic groups. We will do this
with Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model [4]. To do this, we concatenated all
English hashtags by account and then performed LDA with k = 5. We chose to
concatenate hashtags rather than use raw text for computational tractability and
because hashtags provide tokens that capture the essence of topic and meaning.
Word Clouds of the resulting five topic groups are shown in Figure 9. We see that
Topic Groups are differentiated in some ways by geography and in other ways
by politics. This topic groups allow us to segment the conversation and focus on
a topic of interest, for example a certain geography (the Nigerian conversation)
or a specific political affiliation (the conservative political conversation).
The choice of k is just as much an art as a science. If you want to get a view
of the macro topics, use a smaller k, like we did here with k = 5. If you want
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(f) Topic Six (38.1% bot)
Fig. 9: Wordclouds of LDA Topic Groups (corpus consists of hashtags concate-
nated by user)
to extract a very specific conversation (i.e. the liberal conversation in Canada),
you will have to increase k in order to sufficiently isolate the topic of interest.
4.6 Community Detection (Target Audiences)
Similar to topic analysis, we also want to look at community groups. While
topic analysis looked at semantic topics that seem to cluster together, commu-
nity groups look at accounts that tend to cluster together regardless of topic.
We ran louvaine community detection [5] on both the retweet and mention net-
work, and then looked at influential accounts and top hashtags for each of the
top 10 communities. A summarization of the community groups in the retweet
network are summarized in Table 7. Here we see once again that some commu-
nity groups are geographically and/or linguistically oriented, while others are
politically affiliated.
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Table 7: Top 10 Louvaine Community Groups
Size Influential Accounts Top Hashtags Description
3,700,533
36.7%
Bots
NCDCgov
ThatBrightDude
DrOlufunmilayo
akortainment
Mawunya
covid19nigeria
nigeria
wuhan
coronavirusinsa
africa
African Discus-
sion
2,868,851
27.6%
Bots
JoeBiden
kylegriffin1
ryanstruyk
nytimes Yamiche
trump
china
maga
hydroxychloroquine
trumpvirus
Left Leaning
American
Conversation
2,055,555
49.2%
Bots
DiazCanelB
BrunoRguezP
PresidenciaCuba
AleLRoss198
GuerreroCuba
cuba
quedateencasa
eeuu
ecuador
venezuela
Cuba Conversa-
tion
1,685,303
23.0%
Bots
SkyNews
JamesMelville
carolecadwalla
NursingNotesUK
piersmorgan
nhs
stayhomesavelives
ppe
coronavirusuk
china
borisjohnson
British Conversa-
tion
1,510,246
59.8%
Bots
ABSCBNNews
rapplerdotcom
inquirerdotnet
cnnphilippines
ANCALERTS
ja(new coronavirus)
china
ch(new virus)
ja(new corona)
ch(declaration of emer-
gency)
Asian Conversa-
tion
1,456,655
52.0%
Bots
narendramodi
rajbirrohilla
Shrish 1987
deepaggarwal1
im sumit verma
indiafightscorona
india
china
tablighijamaat
pakistan
coronavirusindia
Indian Conversa-
tion
1,330,143
43.1%
Bots
ldpsincomplejos
Alvisepf
matthewbennett
Santi ABASCAL
hermanntertsch
ltimahora
venezuela
quedateencasa
espaa
yomequedoencasa
china
Spanish
Conversation
1,041,880
46.0%
Bots
Conflits FR
Drmartyufml
le Parisien
AiphanMarcel
Brevesdepresse
confinement
macron
masques
france
chloroquine
chine
italie
French conversa-
tion
1,001,444
39.1%
Bots
realDonaldTrump
WhiteHouse
RealJamesWoods
TomFitton
RealCandaceO
TrumpWarRoom
wuhanvirus
qanon
fakenews
hydroxychloroquine
foxnews
trump
ccpvirus
Right Leaning
American
Conversation
872,213
65.4%
Bots
RizmaWidiono
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Zul 88
dwiyanaDKM
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coronaoutbreak
ko(let’s stay home)
coronavirusitalia
Korean
Conversation
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5 Account Characterization
Now that we’ve explored bots in the data, we will begin to look at other ways to
characterize accounts. These include analysis of biased or questionable sources,
abusive languages, and use of national flags.
5.1 Questionable Sources
Next we will look at the political bias found in the URLs. To do this, we will use
the dictionary approach presented in Chapter 11. Using this approach, 18.2%
of the total URL domains were found in the dictionary lookup that we built
in Chapter 11. Having estimated the bias and factual content in the URLs, we
visualize this distribution in Figure 10 where the bar plots are colored by the
proportion of bot involvement.
From this we first see that the highest number of URLs are coming from the
Center and Center Left political bias, and generally have high factual content.
We do see the presence of fake, satire, and conspiracy theory sources in this
stream, which are often correlated with the low factual content seen in Figure
10b. We also see that bots have a higher degree of correlation with URLs from
the far-right and fake-news biases, and to a lesser extent from the far-left. We
also see high bot correlation with URLs containing low factual content. These
discoveries largely confirm our assumptions going into the analysis.
5.2 Abusive Language
We used the multi-lingual dictionary based algorithm presented in Chapter 1111
to identify tweets that contain abusive language. The daily volume of abusive is
presented in Figure 11. We did not normalize this visualization since our total
daily count of tweets was held constant at 4.3 million tweets. If this was not
true, it would be appropriate to normalize this (plot proportion instead of raw
count). This allows us to identify events that seem to aggravate the population
of active Twitter users. The two prominent spikes are tied to political events and
voices in the United States, with the first spike tied to actions by US Congress
and the second spike tied to comments by the US Executive Branch.
We found that 57.7% of the accounts that share abusive content had bot
like characteristics. This is significantly higher than the 41.8% of non-abusive
accounts that have bot-like characteristics. This means that within the COVID-
19 stream bot-like accounts are used to produce or promote abusive content.
5.3 High Flags
As discussed in Chapter 11, at times flags in the user description can indicate
suspicious accounts. This is especially true with multiple flags. To explore this in
the COVID-19 stream, we extracted all flags in the account descriptions for all
27 million accounts. We’ve plotted the distribution of these in Figure 12, with
bars colored by proportion of bots-like accounts.
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Fig. 10: Analysis of Bias and Factual Content Found in URLs.
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Fig. 11: Daily count of abusive Tweets (Tweets that contain abusive terms)
Reviewing the distributions in Figure 12, nothing in the one and two flag
distribution is unexpected or necessarily cause for further exploration. Once we
get to the three, four, five, and six flag distributions, however, these are likely
suspicious accounts. In particular many of these accounts have multiple Western
nations (US, Canada, and European Nations), and may be used to manipulate
multiple Western nations while appearing to be an expatriate.
6 Image/Meme Analysis
6.1 Meme Detection
As discussed in Chapter 10, memes are a powerful way to connect a message
to a target audience. Memes evolve as they propagate through a society. Given
the size of the COVID-19 Stream, we sampled 1 million images (approximately
10% of the total) and conducted meme classification on these. The Meme-Hunter
model classified 37,473 images as memes. A collage of these memes is found in
Figure 13.
Given the massive impact of COVID-19 on society and daily life, many memes
were innocent humor designed to help folks get through some very tough cir-
cumstances. We did find a number of political memes, however, some targeting
domestic pandemic policy discussions and others targeting geo-political compe-
tition. The domestic policy memes were trying to use image and text to argue
for one of the competing priorities: namely the safety of society or the economic
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Fig. 12: Distribution of flag combinations in user descriptions
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Fig. 13: Memes extracted from a sample of 1 million COVID-19 related images.
foundation of that society. The geo-political memes were likely created by nation-
states or nation-state proxies, with many memes created by Russia, China, and
Iran, which will be discussed in more detail below.
6.2 Meme OCR and Topic Analysis
As discussed in Chapter 10, the meme-hunter suite of tools includes a special
meme Optical Character Recognition (OCR) pipeline for meme images. This
was also presented in detail in [3]. We ran meme OCR on the extracted memes
from 1 million images, and conducted wordcloud visual analysis of the results.
These results are found in Figure 14.
From these results we see that a number of general coronavirus memes. We
also see that a number of memes are targeting government leaders, ministers,
and agencies.
6.3 Personalities
Next we used open source facial recognition software8 to identify prominent
politicians and world leaders in the memes. Facial recognition software simply
identifies personalities, but does not indicate whether the meme is supporting or
attacking the specific personality found. A distribution of memes about promi-
nent US politicians and other world leaders is given in Figure 15.
8 https://github.com/ageitgey/face_recognition
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Fig. 15: Distribution of memes on prominent US politicians and other world
leaders (identified with open source facial recognition software)
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Here we see that prominent world leaders are the target of most of the memes
in our sample, with Xi Jinping and Donald Trump in the first and second place
positions, respectively. This also highlights that much of the COVID-19 discus-
sion and information conflict is between the US, China, and Europe.
6.4 Meme Evolution
We next calculated the evolution of the 37,000 memes that Meme-Hunter clas-
sified in our sample. The network was created by using a VGG deep learning
model [14] and extracting the last layer before softmax. Using this 25,088 dimen-
sion vector to represent the image, we then conducted radius nearest neighbor
graph learning with distance = 1200. In Figure 16 we see that many of the
darker image memes are clustered together in the center, with other prominent
memes evolving in clusters that are separate components. We’ve highlighted the
evolution and links between two of the memes.
Fig. 16: Evolution of Memes in the COVID-19 Stream
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7 Sketch-IO
We were able to use the COVID-19 data to test the Sketch-IO prototype appli-
cation for sketching and analyzing information operation campaigns. Given that
our prototype application was not able to ingest the entire stream due to its size,
we instead ingested all data produced by or propagating state sponsored media.
Fig. 17: Demonstration of the Sketch-IO prototype dashboard on the COVID-19
stream.
The Sketch-IO application proved effective and responsive at quickly per-
forming a number of battle drills to analyze this data. Example usage and
screenshots are provided in Figure 17.
8 Foreign Influence Operations
In this section we will identify overt and seemingly overt propaganda operations
by nation state actors. Covert and black propaganda is much harder to detect
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and attribute to a nation state actor (black propaganda is designed to make the
victim appear to be the perpetrator).
We will use the bot labeler function for finding state sponsored media and
state sponsored media amplification as a proxy for finding propaganda. In Fig-
ure 18 we show the number of retweets of state sponsored media accounts as
measured by bot labler. This image is colored by percentage of bots that are
retweeting these accounts. As indicated in Chapter 11, these state sponsored
media vary drastically in purpose and independence (the purpose of Russian
RT is different than the US Voice of America). That being said, we clearly see
that Russia and China are investing heavily in producing and promoting state
sponsored media and messages. These messages are amplified by both bots and
legitimate accounts.
87% Bot
81% Bot
73% Bot
58% Bot
69% Bot
74% Bot
78% Bot
Korea
Iran
USA
Canada
Germany
China
Russia
0 100,000 200,000 300,000
Total Retweets/Mentions
proportion 0.6 0.7 0.8
Propagation of State Sponsored Tweets
Fig. 18: Propagation of State Sponsored Media by Country (colored by propor-
tion of bot involvement)
8.1 Chinese Propaganda
To some extent, the COVID19 pandemic seems to be a turning point for the
Chinese in regards to information operations. Traditionally, Chinese information
operations focused on positive narrative largely pushed by the “50 cent Army”,
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a low-paid or otherwise coopted group of online netizens. Traditionally, they
did not conduct “higher risk higher reward” operations that relied on negative,
antagonizing and controversial statements. This slowly started to change with
the Hong Kong protests in 2019, and fully changed with COVID-19 pandemic,
with China seeming to adopt more aggressive IO practices and operations.
In February 2020, Lijian Zhao was promoted to the Deputy Director General,
Information Department, Foreign Ministry. Foreign Minister Zhao has a history
of aggressive information operations, and seems to be implementing this in the
Chinese information operations as well as personally on social media. On March
12, Zhao posted a tweet that suspected the US Army of bringing the coronavirus
to Wuhan province in China (see Figure 19). Zhao seems to be a key personality
leading and directing China’s more aggressive approach to information opera-
tions.
Fig. 19: Foreign Minister Lijian Zhao’s rise to director of Chinese information
operations seems to correlate with a more aggressive approach than historical
Chinese information operations (Tweet ID: 1238111898828066823).
Chinese propaganda is amplified by Chinese government representatives. Chi-
nese government officials around the world are able to amplify state sponsored
media without questioning it, knowing that only approved messages are pub-
lished. In the COVID-19 stream, the Chinese Ambassador to Venezuela has
the 2nd highest number of state sponsored mentions/retweets. He retweeted or
mentioned Chinese state sponsored Spanish and English COVID-19 content 769
times. The increasing penetration of Chinese state sponsored media around the
world is pushed by these legitimate accounts.
It also appears that China often uses trolls instead of bots. With easy access
to human capital, the Chinese seem to prefer the control and nuance that trolls
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allow compared to a bot Army. Many of the suspicious Chinese accounts contain
enough nuance and temporal patterns to consider them a troll rather than a bot.
We see increased use of meme warfare by China in the COVID-19 stream.
Historically, China has seemed hesitant to use memes, potentially because memes
propagate through evolution, and this evolution is outside of the control of the
state [2]. China has especially been concerned with the evolution of memes within
their own population, and has banned some memes [3]. In COVID-19, however,
we see them developing and deploying memes in a way that is more akin to
Russian information operations. An example of a Chinese meme is provided in
Figure 20a. Here we see a message tied to an image that has clear cultural rele-
vance and traction within the target audience. Additional examples of Chinese
Memes that were found using the Bot-Match methodology are provided in Figure
26 below.
We also found evidence that China is starting to interlace adult oriented and
humorous content with their information in order to increase traffic, particularly
from certain demographics. Examples of this are found in Figure 21). This has
historically been a key part of Russian IO, and it seems that China is increasingly
adopting similar practices. Explicit adult content is often designed to attract and
manipulate the minds of young impressionable men.
In the Chinese propaganda, we see some propaganda uses Chinese language
while others uses English language content. The English text is often accompa-
nied by memes that connect the message with American audiences. The English
language propaganda is arguably targeting American audience, attacking leaders
and institutions in America. It is also designed to strengthen American’s view of
China, Chinese leadership and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The pro-
paganda that uses Chinese language text is arguably targeting Chinese audiences
within China’s borders as well as in other Asian countries. This propaganda is
designed to increase nationalistic fervor within China’s borders.
Within the Chinese propaganda that we viewed, the vast majority was sin-
gularly focused on the United States. This differs from Russian information
operations, which focuses more broadly on the West, adding European actors to
their list of targets.
8.2 Russian Propaganda
Within the COVID-19 stream, Russia appears to be staying with their historical
information playbook. With extensive experience in manipulating world opinion
with their “active measures” throughout the Cold War, Russia has long had one
of the most aggressive and well-resourced information operations capabilities
among nation states. Russia’s information operations are tightly coupled with
their other cyber operations.
Russian information operations rely on increasing penetration of their state
sponsored media around the world. RT, Sputnik, and other state sponsored
media outlets offer news in many languages around the world. These media
outlets offer news stories that support Russian information narratives, as seen
in Figure 22. In this Figure we see state state sponsored media promote stories
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(a) Chinese meme connects propaganda message with American cultural artifact
(Tweet ID: 1247081317784682496)
(b) Chinese information operation combines visual image with geo-political message
(Tweet ID: 1260871418209660928)
Fig. 20: Examples of Chinese Propaganda
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(a) Chinese Propaganda Combined Image and Text Propaganda with Adult Content
(Tweet ID: 1262737238451986432)
(b) Chinese Propaganda Combined Anti-US Propaganda with Adult Content
Fig. 21: China trolls following Russian example by Mixing Propaganda with Ex-
plicit Content. Given the Chinese text, this is arguably targeting domestic au-
diences in China in an attempt to strengthen nationalism and support for the
CCP (Tweet ID: 1266697198177095687).
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that Russia provided more help to the Italian population than did the European
Union.
As seen in Figure 22b, Russian operations still use large and sophisticated
bot “armies” to push their content. This observation is supported by the quanti-
tative analysis seen in Figure 18, which shows the amplification of Russian state
sponsored messages is 78% bots.
As indicated above, Russian operations target the West in general, with Eu-
ropean targets receiving almost as much emphasis as the United States. This dif-
fers from Chinese operations, which seem to primarily target the United States,
with smaller efforts directed at Europe. In Figure 23 we see examples of Russian
state media trolling the West. While Russian state sponsored media advertise
themselves as news organizations, this content is arguably well beyond reporting
unbiased news.
8.3 Iranian Propaganda
On 6 April 2020, Iran initiated a concerted attack on the United States trying
to encourage California to exit the union. Most of this effort was tagged with
#CalExit. By the time the dust settled approximately 30K tweets had been
launched by a several thousand strong bot/troll Army. This is not the first time
that #CalExit (or other similar messages like #Texit), have become trending
hashtags on Twitter largely due to foreign information operations. The 6 April
surge appears to be largely Iranian influence operation that was triggered by
domestic political tension in the United States. In the days and weeks preceding
6 April, tensions between US national leadership and California leadership inten-
sified, and the governor of California referred to California as a “nation-state”
[13]. The Iranian government and/or proxies appeared to be monitoring these
political tensions in the United States, and timed their #CalExit campaign to
capitalize on them. This 24 hour information operation had some creative content
with many human/troll accounts and limited automation. The creative content
can be seen in the meme collage in Figure 24.
9 Bot Match to Find Foreign Influencers
As discussed in Chapter 9, bot-match can be a very powerful tool for finding
similar accounts given a seed account. Bot-Match allows you to find similar ac-
counts where similarity can be defined by network proximity, semantic proximity,
or a combination of both. The size of our network and tweet corpus limit the
number of models available for measuring similarity. We first concatenate all
user text, thereby aggregating content to the account level. Because of the size
of our corpus, we then used cosine similarity on a document-term matrix (also
known as a bag-of-words) with 4000 top words. This was created for English
tweets.
We used this to identify accounts that were propagating Chinese propaganda
in English. We used @SafiSina1 as our seed account (this account was discovered
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(a) Russian Propaganda promotes story that Italians favor Russia and Russian lead-
ership over European Union leadership (Tweet ID: 1243453201891725312)
(b) Russian Propaganda is pushed by large bot “armies”
Fig. 22: Russian Information Operations rely on state sponsored media messages
pushed by large bot armies
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(a) Russian State Sponsored Media promote geo-political messages
that extend beyond reporting news (Tweet ID: 1262513293714849793)
(b) Russian State Sponsored media trolls European leaders (Tweet
ID: 1262966278555176960)
Fig. 23: Examples of Russian Propaganda attacking the West
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Fig. 24: Memes used in an Iranian information operation initiated on 6 April
2020. The attack encouraged California citizens and leadership to exit the United
States.
above in Figure 20b). We illustrate in Figure 25 how we recursively build out the
Chinese propaganda network with Bot-Match. Notice that we did not have to
conduct any elaborate labeling or training process, we just needed to start with
our seed node and the document-term matrix. All accounts seen in Figure 25 are
amplifying Chinese state sponsored media, and are each embedded in slightly
different networks.
Using the Bot-Match methods illustrated in Figure 25, we were able to iden-
tify approximately 20 additional accounts that appeared to be propagating Chi-
nese propaganda targeting America. We then used the Twitter REST API to
scrape the timeline history of these accounts, extract image links, and run Meme-
Hunter on the images shared by these accounts. We found that indeed all of
these accounts were conducting very targeted information operations against
the United States around the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the American
protest that followed the death of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis po-
lice officer. A collage of a sample of these targeted memes is provided in Figure
26.
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Fig. 25: Bot-Match was recursively used to find accounts that are propagating
and amplifying Chinese state propaganda. In this image, @SafiSina1 (see Figure
20b) was used as the seed account.
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Fig. 26: Sample of expansive use of Chinese memes propagated by 20 accounts
discovered with Bot-Match
10 Discussion of BEND Forms of Maneuver
Throughout our analysis of foreign influence, we observed their use of the BEND
forms of maneuver. We continue to observe that Russia closely intertwines nar-
rative and network maneuvers. They conduct long and protracted efforts to in-
filtrate target audiences before interjecting narrative. China, while working hard
to control and manipulate the narrative, does not appear to infiltrate targeted
subcultures. They do appear to tie their narrative to the target audience culture
as seen above with memes based on the Friends sitcom as well as memes that use
the George Floyd protests to support pro-CCP policies. With the limited net-
work maneuver, it remains to be seen whether their information operations gain
traction or simply become a “shot in the dark.” Iran also appeared to launch
large attributed information campaigns focused on a specific narrative such as
#CalExit, without first preparing target networks. Once again, these operations
may become information warfare “chaff” with limited effects.
11 Conclusion
The primary goal of this case study was to illustrate social cybersecurity work-
flows in a relevant event. Using the apt COVID-19 Twitter stream from 15 March
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to 30 April 2020, we demonstrated how to collect the data, conduct initial ex-
ploratory data analysis, conduct and use bot and meme classification and explo-
ration, conduct account characterization, and demonstrate the role of Sketch-IO
and the BEND Framework. This chapter therefore serves as an example for
social cybersecurity researchers on how to leverage these tools to identify and
characterize offensive information operations targeting their society, institutions
and culture.
In regards to the COVID-19 pandemic, we found large information operations
trying to manipulate domestic and international perceptions, beliefs, and actions.
At the domestic level the information conflict was largely over pandemic policy,
particularly whether public safety or the economy were more important. At the
international level we identified attempts to manipulate international perception
of the origins of the disease as well as perceptions of each countries handling
of the disease. We also see nation-state efforts to amplify tensions and drive
wedges in existing fissures in rival nations. Throughout the data we see bots
and trolls used to scale and spread narrative, therefore acting like a “force-
multiplier” in information operations. We see Russia continue to use memes,
and China massively increase their use of memes in information warfare. Both
nations study their target audience and choose relevant cultural artifacts to
connect their memes and messages to the target audience.
Even as the COVID-19 coronavirus moved much of business and society to
use virtual platforms for social interaction as well as business and collabora-
tion, it also allowed many nation-states to increasingly use virtual platforms for
competition in the information space with ramifications for geo-politics. While
the effects of these campaigns are hard to measure, their scale and persistence
require social cybersecurity policy and process.
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